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Abstract
In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender
holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network.
The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by its neighbors. There is a weight
associated with every edge that represents the efficiency defending resources are shared be-
tween neighboring nodes. We consider the setting when each attack can affect not only the
target node, but its neighbors as well. Assuming that nodes in the network have different
treasures to defend and different defending requirements, the defender aims at allocating the
defending resource to the nodes to minimize the loss due to attack. We give polynomial time
exact algorithms for two important special cases of the network defending problem. For the
case when an attack can only affect the target node, we present an LP-based exact algorithm.
For the case when defending resources cannot be shared, we present a max-flow-based exact
algorithm. We show that the general problem is NP-hard, and we give a 2-approximation
algorithm based on LP-rounding. Moreover, by giving a matching lower bound of 2 on the
integrality gap on the LP relaxation, we show that our rounding is tight.
1 Introduction
In the recent years, security games have gained an increasing popularity within the artificial in-
telligence research community, and have been widely used in many areas of the field [LCM09,
Tam11, YT12]. Many of these games are played within a network structure (i.e., network secu-
rity games), where a defender protects a set of targets from an attacker by allocating defensive
resources to nodes (or edges) of a network. Such problems include, but are not limited to, the
following: designing network interdiction strategies for infectious disease control [Ass87], cyber-
security mechanisms for defending computer networks [STX+18], or police patrolling plans in
urban security domains [ZAT+17]. Existing network security models typically assume that: (i)
one single security resource can be used to protect one single target only; (ii) the resource allo-
cation happens in a binary manner, i.e., a target is either protected or not; and (iii) an attack on a
single target does not have effect to other (possibly neighbouring) targets.
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However, in many real-world scenarios security resources often effectively protect multiple
targets simultaneously. Furthermore, multiple resources can be allocated to the same target to
strengthen the target’s defence.
Example 1.1 Consider a police patrolling problem in which law enforcement forces are allocated
to different districts of a city for patrolling. The more resources are allocated to a certain district,
the more successful crime prevention can be achieved. In addition, in case of an urban crime event
(e.g., bank robbery), patrolling forces from neighboring areas (i.e., nodes with edge connections
to the target) can also provide help to the resources already at the target node.
On the other hand, successful attacks can also produce certain damages to neighboring targets.
Example 1.2 Consider the scenario when a chemical terrorist attack in which a toxic chemical
weapon (e.g., sarin gas, or nerve agents) is used in a certain area. As the wind can blow the gas
away from the original target area, the weapon can also generate damage in surrounding areas
(although this damage is typically weakened, compared to the damage the attack would achieve
at the original target).
Put differently, in many real-world applications, the damage depends not only on how well
the node under attack is defended, but also on the defence of its neighbors. As these examples
demonstrate, it is essential to take into account both the ability of sharing defending resources
between nodes of the network, and the wide coverage of the attacks. In this paper, we consider a
general defending problem on a network where
• the defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by its neighbors;
• the damage due to attack at a target node depends not only on the defending power of the
target node, but also on that of its neighboring nodes.
1.1 Related Work
As mentioned above, most of the existing work in the security domain ignore resource sharing
between nodes. A notable exception is the work of [GAV15], in which allocating a defending
resource to a node can also protect the neighbors of that node. However, their model only looks
at the binary version of resource allocation, where allocating multiple resources to the same node
is not considered. Thus it can not be used to tackle our problem. To address the multi-resource
allocation problem, [VLS18] has looked at a Colonel Blotto formulation of the security game
setting. However, their work does not exploit the underlying network structure. In addition,
they do not consider the effect of the attacks to the surrounding nodes. It is worth noting that
there is a line of security games research that look at attackers with multiple resources [KCP11,
YVAH16, WS17]. These models can be seen as somewhat relevant to our work as a single attack
can have impact to more than one nodes. In addition, [CCO17] looked at the case that having an
insufficiently protected node can affect the defence level of neighboring nodes, which is similar
to our setting. However, these models do not take into account the defence side network-based
resource sharing.
There is a large body of literature that studies contagion in network security games. For
example, [BDG13, AMO16, LSV17] looked at stochastic contagion in network security problems.
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However, their model assume that the contagion is independently decided at each node, which is
not the case in our setting. In addition, [TNT12, APH18] studied a shared resource model in which
two players, namely the attacker and the defender, try to maximize their influence on a network.
Similary, [NAB09, VL15] looked at generic target interdependency (i.e., an attack at one target
might affect other targets as well) models. However, these models do not discuss the defending
thresholds or the loss due to attack, and thus are different from our model.
1.2 Our Results
Against this background, this paper addresses the network defending problem with shared re-
sources in the following way: To capture the resource sharing ability, we allow a node v to share
its resource to its neighbor u (weighted with a certain sharing coefficient wuv). In addition, we
assign two defence level thresholds LBu ≤ UBu to each node u to represent the spatial spread
effect of an attack as follows: at each target node u, we need at least LBu resources to prevent any
damages at the local level (i.e., on node u), and we need at least UBu resources to stop the spread
of the attack to neighboring nodes of u (for more details see Section 2).
Given this model, we first look at two special cases, namely: (i) when an attack cannot spread
to the target node’s neighbours; and (ii) when sharing defending resources is not feasible. The
former can be captured by setting LBu = UBu for each node u, and thus, we refer to it as the
Single Threshold Model. The latter is referred to as the Isolated Model (as resource sharing is not
allowed between neighbors)1.
In particular, we prove the following theorems:
Theorem 1.1 (Single Threshold Model) The single threshold network defending problem can be
solved in O(nω log n) time, where n is the number of nodes in the network and ω ≈ 2.373 is the
matrix multiplication factor.
Theorem 1.2 (Isolated Model) The isolated network defending problem can be solved exactly in
O(mn log n) time, where n andm are the number of nodes and edges in the network, respectively.
We also show that the general case of the problem is NP-hard, and therefore, we propose a
2-approximation algorithm. In particular, we prove the following theorems.
Theorem 1.3 (Problem Hardness) The network defending problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 1.4 (Approximation Algorithm) There exists a 2-approximation algorithm for the net-
work defending problem that runs in O(mn log n) time (n is the number of nodes, and m is the
number of edges).
We remark that our algorithm approximates the problem in a resource augmentation manner.
That is, we show that by using a total defending resource 2R, the object of our algorithm is at most
that of any algorithm that uses defending resource R. As we will show in Section 4, the problem
with the objective of minimizing the damage does not admit any polynomial time approximation
algorithm, unless P=NP.
1The name “isolated” means that defending resources can not be shared. However, the damage due to attack still
depends on the defending powers of the target node and its neighbors.
3
2 Model Description
We model the network as an undirected connected graph G(V,E), where each node u ∈ V has
a lower bound LBu and an upper bound UBu, where LBu ≤ UBu, that represent the defending
requirement. Besides, each node u has a value gu and a discounted value g′u ≤ gu that represent
the damage due to attack on node u.
Definition 2.1 (Defending Resource and Defending Power) The defender has a total resource
of R that can be distributed to nodes in V , where ru is the defending resource2 allocated to node
u, and
∑
u∈V ru = R.
The defending power of node u is given by
pu := ru +
∑
v:(u,v)∈E wuv · rv,
where wuv is the weight of edge (u, v) that represents the efficiency defending resource is shared
between u and v.
When the attacker attacks a node u:
1. If the defending power pu ≥ UBu, the attacker gains 0.
2. If the defending power pu ∈ [LBu,UBu), the attacker gains g′u if u has neighbor v with
defending power pv < LBv; gains 0 otherwise.
3. If the defending power pu < LBu, the attacker gains gu.
The intuition behind this formulation is that if there is sufficiently large defending power at
target node u (i.e., pu ≥ UBu), the attack can be quickly mitigated (e.g., the robber will be
quickly caught, or the toxic gas can be completely neutralized). Thus neither the target node nor
its neighbors suffer from any damage. On the other hand, if the attack cannot be quickly mitigated,
but the defending power at target u is sufficient to locally stop the attack (i.e., LBu ≤ pu < UBu),
then the attack may spread to the neighbors of uwith a weakened power. In this case, the weakened
attack achieves some success (i.e., g′u damage) if some neighbor of u is not sufficiently protected
(i.e., has inadequate defending power). Finally, if the target node itself has insufficient protection
(i.e., pu < LBu, the attack achieves its maximal damage gu.
The objective of the defender is to allocate the defending resource to the nodes to minimize
the gain of the attacker (which can attack only one node). We call {ru}u∈V a defending strategy.
For every defending strategy, there exists a node by attacking which the attacker gains the most.
We call the resulting gain of the attacker the defending result.
We call the model single threshold if LBu = UBu for all nodes u ∈ V : in this model, when
some node u is attacked, the attacker gains either gu or 0, e.g., the attack does not spread to any
neighbor of u. This model is inspired by many real-world scenarios, ranging from urban crime and
conventional terrorist attacks, to various cybersecurity threats and wildlife reservation problems
(i.e., green security games). The common in these scenarios is that a single attack does not have
a spreading effect, and thus the damage does not depend on the defending power of neighboring
nodes.
2In our model the resource can be allocated continuously.
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We call the model isolated if wuv = 0 for all edges (u, v) ∈ E. The intuition behind this
special case is that in some real-world applications, we cannot share resources between nodes.
For example, consider a disease outbreak scenario where the success of defence depends on the
size of vaccinated population at each region. While the disease itself can spread to the neighboring
areas if the vaccinated population is not sufficiently high (i.e., pu < UBu), the strength of defence
of a particular area cannot be transferred to another region.
We use N(u) := {v : (u, v) ∈ E} to denote the set of neighbors for every node u ∈ V . We
use n and m to denote the number of nodes and edges in the graph G, respectively. We use OPT
to denote the optimal defending result.
3 Exact Algorithms for Special Cases
Before turning to the general version of the problem, as a warm-up, we first consider the two
special cases in this section. We present polynomial time algorithms that solve the two cases
exactly.
3.1 Naı¨ve Attempt
Observe that for any defending strategy, there exists a node on which the attacker has maximum
gain, which we refer to as the vulnerable node. Since the goal of the problem is to minimize the
defending result, a natural algorithm would keep allocating defending resources to the vulnerable
node until all resources are spent. We refer to this algorithm as Greedy. Unfortunately, as Figure 1
shows, even in the isolated model, Greedy can perform arbitrarily bad. Since node u1 has the
largest value, the Greedy algorithm will allocate at least 2 units of resource to u1. Consequently,
both u2, u3 have defending power at most 1, which results in ALG = 10, where ALG is the
defending result of the Greedy algorithm.
             
10 1 10  
1 1 1LB 
2 2 2UB 
0 0
Figure 1: Hard instance for Greedy, in which g′u = gu, R = 3, and wu1u2 = wu2u3 = 0 (isolated model).
It is easy to check that for this instance, OPT = 0 by allocating one unit of resource to each node, while
ALG = 10.
The intuition is, there are two solutions to protect the vulnerable node u in the isolated model
by allocating defending resources: either we guarantee that pu ≥ UBu, or all neighbors v of u
has pv ≥ LBv. However, solving the problem “locally” (as Greedy does) does not lead to a good
defending strategy. This observation implies that the defending resources should be allocated in a
“global” way that considers the effect on both the vulnerable node and its neighbors.
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While this problem does not exist in the single threshold model, it is easy to show that the
Greedy also performs arbitrarily bad in this model: consider the graph instance shown in Figure 1,
where we change wu1u2 = wu2u3 = 1 and LBu = UBu = 3 for all u ∈ {u1, u2, u3}. Obviously
we still have OPT = 0. However, Greedy will allocate all resources to either u1 or u3, which
results in ALG = 10.
The two hard instances for the Greedy algorithm imply that to solve the problem, we need to
take into account the effect on neighbors of u, when allocating defending resource to a node u. A
key difference between our algorithms and the Greedy algorithm is that we set a defending result
goal before allocating any resource, and try to allocate resource globally to achieve this goal. In
order to produce defending strategies in a global manner, we use the linear programming (LP) and
maximum flow techniques.
3.2 Single Threshold Model
We first consider the single threshold model, i.e., LBu = UBu for every node u ∈ V . We show
that combining the linear programming technique with a simple binary search, we can solve this
problem exactly in polynomial time.
Since LBu = UBu for all u ∈ V , the attack is either successful or unsuccessful immediately
after attacking some node. Therefore, while there are infinitely many defending strategies, the
number of defending results is bounded by n+ 1. Let G = {gu : u ∈ V } ∩ {0} be the defending
result space, i.e., the possible defending results.
Suppose for every α ∈ G, we can decide in polynomial time whether the defending result α is
achievable (and output a solution if it is), then we can compute the optimal defending strategy in
polynomial time. Here we call α ∈ G achievable if and only if there exists a defending strategy
(using R defending resource) with defending result α. In the following, we show how to decide
the achievability for every α ∈ G. More importantly, we output a feasible defending strategy if α
is achievable.
Definition 3.1 (Vulnerable Nodes) Let
Aα := {u ∈ V : gu > α}
be the nodes that need a defending power at least LBu, if the target defending result is α.
By definition, if any of u ∈ A has defending power pu < LBu, then the attacker gains gu >
α by attacking u, which violates our target defending result. Hence the goal is to compute a
defending strategy under which every node u ∈ A has defending power at least LBu.
This is actually a simple task, as we can formulate the problem as a feasibility linear program,
in which the defending resources allocated to the nodes are the variables.
min . 0
s.t.
∑
u∈V ru = R,
ru +
∑
v∈N(u)wuvrv ≥ LBu, ∀u ∈ Aα
ru ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ V.
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Observe that any feasible solution for the above LP gives a defending strategy with defending
result at most α. On the other hand, if the LP is infeasible, then the target defending result α is
not achievable.
By the state-of-the-art result by [CLS19], we can solve the above LP in O(nω) time, where
ω ≈ 2.373 is the matrix multiplication factor. Thus by trivially enumerating all possible values of
α ∈ G, we can solve the problem inO(nω+1) time. Indeed, observe that if α is achievable, then all
values at least α are also achievable. Thus by using a binary search on α ∈ G, we can output the
feasible solution for the minimum achievable α as the optimal defending strategy in O(nω log n)
time, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.1.
3.3 Isolated Model
Next we turn to the isolated model. Recall that by definition we have wuv = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ E,
but nodes can have arbitrary upper and lower bounds. We show in this section that the isolated
model can be solved exactly in polynomial time, using the maximum flow technique. Similar to
the previous analysis, observe that given gu and g′u for all u ∈ V and c, we have OPT ∈ G :=
{gu : u ∈ V } ∪ {g′u : u ∈ V } ∪ {0}. In other words, there are at most 2n+ 1 different defending
results. Hence to solve the problem, we only need to identify the minimum value in G that is
achievable using R defending resource, and output a defending strategy achieving it.
Let α ∈ G be the aim of the defending result.
Algorithm for Testing the Achievability of α. As before, we define Aα = {u ∈ V : gu > α}
to be the vulnerable nodes that need to receive at least LBu of defending power. Note that in the
isolated model, we must allocate a defending resource at least LBu to every u ∈ Aα to guarantee
a defending result at most α. Let Bα ⊆ Aα be {u ∈ V : g′u > α}, i.e., those u ∈ Aα who need
to receive at least UBu of defending power, or each of its neighbors v ∈ N(u) has pv ≥ LBv. We
call Bα the set of crucial nodes. It remains to decide which crucial nodes u should be assigned
defending power UBu (the remaining nodes will be covered by their neighbors). For ease of
notation we drop the subscript α on Aα and Bα in the following discussion.
Suppose S ⊆ B are the nodes we decide to allocate a defending resource of UBu to, i.e.,
we allocate an extra UBu − LBu to every node u ∈ S. To achieve the defending result, we
need to guarantee that every neighbor v ∈ N(u) of u ∈ B \ S receives at least LBv. Since all
nodes u ∈ A are already allocated a defending resource LBu, it suffices to allocate LBv to every
v ∈ (V \A) ∩⋃u∈B\S N(u).
LetN(B\S) = ⋃u∈B\S N(u) be the neighbors of nodes inB\S. The total resource required
is given by ∑
u∈A
LBu +
∑
u∈S
(UBu − LBu) +
∑
v∈(V \A)∩N(B\S)
LBv.
In the following, we show that the problem of computing the set S ⊆ B that minimizes the
total defending resource can be solved by computing a maximum flow on a directed network with
O(|V |) nodes and O(|E|) edges. Note that the defending result α is achievable if and only if the
minimum defending resource required is at most R.
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Flow Network. Let the nodes of the directed flow network be {uin, uout : u ∈ B} ∪ {vin, vout :
v ∈ V \ A} ∪ {s, t}, where s is the source and t is the sink. The edges of the network are
constructed as follows.
1. For every u ∈ B ∪ (V \ A), let there be a directed edge from uin to uout. For all u ∈ B, let
the capacity of the edge be UBu − LBu. For all v ∈ V \ A, let the capacity of the edge be
LBv.
2. For every u ∈ B, let there be a directed edge from s to uin. For every v ∈ V \ A, let there
be a directed edge from vout to t. For every (u, v) ∈ E such that u ∈ B and v ∈ V \ A, let
there be a directed edge from uout to vin. Let the capacity of these edges be infinity.
          
     
          
 
… …
    ∖  
UB  − LB 
LB ∞ ∞
∞
Figure 2: Illustrating figure of the flow network.
The flow network has O(n) nodes and O(n+m) edges.
Intuitively, we construct a directed network based on the bipartite graph betweenB and V \A.
Observe that in the directed flow network, to separate s and t, either the edge (uin, uout) is cut for
u ∈ B, or (vin, vout) is cut for every neighbor v ∈ V \ A of u. By setting the capacities as above,
we guarantee that every cut separating s and t corresponds to a feasible defending strategy.
By the max-flow min-cut theorem, computing the maximum flow from s to t is equivalent to
finding the minimum s-t cut. Consider the minimum s-t cut that partitions the nodes into two sets
S and T , such that s ∈ S and t ∈ T . Let cut(S, T ) be the total capacity of edges between S and
T .
Since the edges from s and the edges to t have infinite capacity, we have uin ∈ S for all u ∈ B,
and vout ∈ T for all v ∈ V \A. Observe that for every u ∈ B,
1. if uout /∈ S, then the edge (uin, uout) is cut by (S, T );
2. if uout ∈ S, then for every v ∈ N(u)∩ (V \A), i.e., neighbor of u that is not in A, we must
have vin ∈ S, as the capacity of the edge from uout to vin is infinity. Consequently, we know
that edge (vin, vout) is cut by (S, T ).
LetBs := {u ∈ B : uout ∈ S} andBt = B\Bs. LetN(Bs) =
⋃
u∈Bs N(u) be the neighbors
of nodes in Bs. Then we have
cut(S, T ) =
∑
u∈Bt
(UBu − LBu) +
∑
v∈N(Bs)∩(V \A)
LBv.
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In other words, the total capacity of the cut is exactly the defending resource required to
increase the defending power of every u ∈ Bt from LBu to UBu, and every neighbor v of u ∈ Bs
that is not in A from 0 to LBv. Hence the minimum s-t cut corresponds to the optimal defending
strategy with defending result α.
Running Time. The maximum flow problem on a directed network with n nodes and m edges
can be solved in O(mn) time by [Orl13]. Testing the achievability of every α ∈ G (and outputting
a solution, if any) can be done in O(mn) time. As before, by adopting a binary search on values
of G, we can identify the minimum achievable α in O(mn log n) time, which completes the proof
of Theorem 1.2.
4 Hardness Results
As we have shown in the previous section, for the single threshold model (i.e., every node u has
LBu = UBu) and the isolated model (i.e., wuv = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ E), the problem is polynomial
time solvable. A natural idea is to combine the two techniques we have used to solve the special
cases, namely the linear programming and the maximum flow computation, and solve the general
problem in polynomial time. Unfortunately, as we will show in this section, the general version of
the problem is indeed NP-hard and thus the approach fails.
Nevertheless, we will show in the next section that, the combination of the techniques provides
a tight rounding scheme that gives a 2-approximation algorithm.
To prove the NP-hardness (Theorem 1.3), we use a reduction from a fundamental boolean
function satisfactory problem called MAX-DNF.
Definition 4.1 (MAX-DNF) In the problem, we have boolean variables x1, . . . , xp and clauses
C1, . . . , Cq, where each clause Ci is the conjunction (“and”) of variables or their negations (see
Figure 3 for an example). The problem aims at finding an assignment to the variables such that a
maximum number of clauses are satisfied.
The problem is shown to be NP-hard by [BP03, EP07]. In the following, we show how to
reduce the MAX-DNF problem to ours. In other words, we show that if the network defending
problem can be solved in polynomial time, then the MAX-DNF problem can also be solved in
polynomial time.
Reduction. Given any MAX-DNF problem instance, we create 2p nodes, which are labeled by
x1, x1, . . . , xp, xp; and q nodes labeled by C1, . . . , Cq. We call these nodes variable nodes and
clause nodes, respectively. Let there be an edge between every pair of xi and xi. For every clause
Ci = a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ak, where each aj represents a variable or its negation, we create k nodes, each
labeled by (Ci, aj). We call these nodes connectors. Let connector (Ci, aj) be connected to aj
and Ci. Note that in the resulting graph, every connector has degree two, every variable node has
degree equal to its total number of appearances in the clauses, and every clause node has degree
equal to the number of variables it contains (see Figure 3 for an illustrating example).
Let we = 1 for the edges e adjacent to variable nodes; let we = 0 for the edges e adjacent
to clause nodes. Let gu = g′u = 1 for variable nodes and clause nodes; let gu = g′u = 0 for
9
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Figure 3: Illustrating example with p = 3 variables x1, x2, x3 and q = 4 clauses C1, C2, C3, C4.
connectors. For every variable node or connector, let UBu = LBu = 1; for every clause node, let
UBu =
1
q and LBu = 0. Let R = p+
q−t
q , for some t < q.
We show that there exists a defending strategy with defending result 0 if and only if there exits
an assignment to the variables such that at least t clauses are satisfied.
First, if there exits an assignment to the variables such that at least t clauses are satisfied, then
we
• allocate 1 unit of defending resource to every variable node that is “true” in the assignment;
• allocate 1q defending resource to every unsatisfied clause.
Trivially, the total defending resource required is at most p+ q−tq . Next we show that the defending
result is 0.
Since the edges adjacent to variable nodes have weight 1, every variable node u has defending
power 1 = UBu. Moreover, if a variable (or its negation) is true, then each of its connector
neighbors v has defending power 1 = UBv. Consequently, if a clause is satisfied, then all its
connector neighbors have defending power above their lower bound. Therefore, the defending
result is 0, as all variable nodes and clause nodes are well-defended.
Next we show the other direction, i.e., the optimal defending strategy corresponds to an as-
signment of variables such that at least t clauses are satisfied.
We first show that every defending strategy can be transformed into a canonical form, while
the defending result is not affected. Fix any defending strategy {ru}u∈V .
Canonical Transformation. For every connector u, if ru > 0, then we reallocate the resource
to its variable node neighbor. Since the edge between u and its variable node neighbor has weight
1 while the edge between u and its clause node neighbor has weight 0, reallocating the resource
does not decrease the defending power of any node. Next, if ru < 1 for a variable node u, then we
reallocate its defending resource to its variable node neighbor, which does not change its defending
power. The defending power of the connector neighbors of u will be decreased (to 0). However,
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since ru < 1, the defending powers of these connectors were less than their lower bounds. Hence
decreasing their defending power does not affect the defending result.
Fix the optimal defending strategy of canonical form. Suppose the defending result is 0. Then
at least one of xi and x¯i must be assigned defending resource 1. Given thatR < n+1, exactly one
of xi, x¯i has defending resource 1, while the other has defending resource 0 (which corresponds to
an assignment to the variables). A connector has defending power 1 if it is connected to a variable
node with defending resource 1. Hence, if all neighbors (which are connectors) of some clause
node Ci have defending power 1, then we do not need to allocate any defending resource to Ci.
On the other hand, if a clause u is not satisfied, then 1q defending resource must be allocated to u.
Since the total defending resource deployed is at most p+ q−tq , we know that at most q − t clause
nodes receive non-zero defending resource. Therefore, we can retrieve an assignment of variables
such that at least t clauses are satisfied given the optimal defending strategy.
Note that by varying t from 1 to q, we can solve the MAX-DNF problem using q computations3
of our problem. Thus the problem is NP-hard.
Since it is NP-hard to distinguish whether OPT = 0 for the above hard instance, the problem
does not admit any approximation algorithm with bounded ratio: any such algorithm can be used
to distinguish whether OPT = 0.
Corollary 4.1 The network defending problem (that aims at minimizing the defending result) does
not admit any polynomial-time approximation algorithm, unless P= NP.
5 Resource Augmentation Algorithms
Since the network defending problem is not approximable, instead of comparing the gain of the
attacker with bounded defending power, we measure the approximation ratio of the problem in
terms of defending power deployed in this section. Formally speaking, we call an algorithm k-
approximate if by using R defending resource, the defending result is at most that of any optimal
defending strategy using Rk resource. In other words, a k-approximate algorithm guarantees that
by using k times more resource, the defending result is at least as good as the optimal solution
(without augmenting the resource).
In this section, we present a 2-approximate algorithm for the general network defending prob-
lem (Theorem 1.4).
As before, for every fixed α ∈ G = {gu : u ∈ V } ∪ {g′u : u ∈ V } ∪ {0}, we check if it is
possible to allocate the R defending resource such that the resulting defending result is at most
α. Note that to achieve an approximation ratio of 2, we show that, as long as α is achievable
(by the optimal solution) using R2 defending resource, our algorithm (with R defending resource)
computes in polynomial time a defending strategy with defending result at most α.
Vulnerable and Crucial Nodes. Again, let A = {u : gu > α} be the vulnerable nodes, and
B = {u : g′u > α} be the crucial nodes. Then the problem is (similar to what we have done in
Section 3.3) to (1) decide a set of nodes S ⊆ B; (2) allocate the resources such that every u ∈ S
3Indeed, we can apply a binary search, which reduces the number of computations to O(log q).
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has a defending power at least UBu, and every v ∈ A ∪
⋃
u∈B\S N(u) has a defending power at
least LBv.
Note that for every fixed S ⊆ B, the second step can be easily done using an LP, as we have
done in Section 3.2. The difficulty, thus, lies in identifying the subset S ⊆ B such that the required
total defending resource is minimized.
Integer Program Formulation. Observe that we can formulate the problem into a feasibility
integer program. In the integer program, there is a variable yu ∈ {0, 1} associated with every
u ∈ B indicating whether u is in S, i.e., receives defending power UBu; there is a variable
yv ∈ {0, 1} associated with every v ∈ V \A indicating whether v receives defending power LBv.
The solution y is feasible if
(1) for every u ∈ B such that yu = 0, all its neighbors v in V \A have yv = 1. In other words,
yu + yv ≥ 1;
(2) there exists {ru}u∈V with
∑
u∈V ru = R such that
LBu + yu · (UBu − LBu) ≤ pu, ∀u ∈ B
LBu ≤ pu, ∀u ∈ A \B
yv · LBv ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V \A
where pu = ru +
∑
v∈N(u)wuv · rv is the defending power of u, under defending strategy
{ru}u∈V .
In other words, constraint (1) requires that, for every u ∈ B, either u has defending power
UBu, i.e., yu = 1; or all its neighbors4 v has defending power at least LBv. Constraint (2)
requires that there exists a defending strategy using total resource R such that all nodes receive
the specified defending power. Given that we are aiming for a 2-approximation, we change the
constraint
∑
u∈V ru = R to
∑
u∈V ru =
R
2 , i.e., we are comparing with the optimal defending
strategy using R2 defending resource.
The standard LP relaxation (similar to the minimum cut problem) can be formulated as fol-
lows. Let F := E ∩ (B × (V \A)) be the edges between B and V \A.
min . 0
s.t. yu + yv ≥ 1, ∀(u, v) ∈ F
yu ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ B ∪ (V \A)
LBu + yu · (UBu − LBu) ≤ pu, ∀u ∈ B
LBu ≤ pu, ∀u ∈ A \B
yv · LBv ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V \A
ru +
∑
v∈N(u)wuv · rv = pu, ∀u ∈ V∑
u∈V ru = R/2.
4Given that nodes v ∈ A have defending power at least LBv in any case, we only need to put constraints on its
neighbors in V \A.
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It is easy show that the above LP is indeed a relaxation of the integer problem of interest. As
long as constraint (1) is satisfied, the first constraint of the above LP is satisfied. The remaining
constraints are satisfied by constraint (2).
Next, we show that the LP is feasible if there exists a defending strategy {ru}u∈V using R2
resource with defending result at most α. Fix any such defending strategy. It gives a feasible
solution for the above LP as follows:
1. ∀u ∈ B, set yu = 1 if pu ≥ UBu; yu = 0 otherwise;
2. ∀v ∈ V \A, set yv = 1 if pv ≥ LBv; yv = 0 otherwise.
It suffices to check the first set of constraints to guarantee feasibility. By the feasibility of the
strategy, for every pair of neighbors u ∈ B and v ∈ V \ A, at least one of yu, yv is set to be 1.
Thus the constraints are satisfied.
It remains to show that, if the LP is feasible, then our algorithm computes (in polynomial time)
a defending strategy with defending result at most α using R defending resource. Our defending
strategy is constructed using any feasible solution of the LP as a guidance. In the following,
we give a geometric interpretation for the solution, which reveals some connections between our
approximation algorithm and our max-flow based algorithm in Section 3.3.
Geometric Interpretation. Imagine there are two extra nodes s and t, where s is at position 0
and t is at position 1. It would be easier to imagine the two nodes as the source and sink, as we
have done in Section 3.3. For every u ∈ B, variable yu ∈ [0, 1] indicates the distance between
s and u; for every v ∈ V \ A, yv indicates the distance between v and t. If yu = 1 for some
u ∈ B, i.e., we put node u at position of t, then we ensure that u has defending power UBu (recall
that in Section 3.3, this is the case when edge (uin, uout) is cut). If yv = 1 for some v ∈ V \ A,
i.e., we put node v at position of s, then we ensure that v has defending power LBv (recall that in
Section 3.3, this is the case when edge (vin, vout) is cut). The constraint yu + yv ≥ 1 for every pair
of neighbors u ∈ B and v ∈ V \A guarantees that the position of v is before that of u. Specifically,
if u ∈ B does not have defending power at least UBu, then all its neighbors v ∈ V \ A should
have defending power at least LBv.
Rounding and Feasibility. Given the optimal solution (y, r) for the above LP, we construct a
feasible integral solution (Y, r′), i.e., a defending strategy using R defending resource, as follows.
For every u ∈ B ∩ (V \ A), set Yu = 1 if yu ≥ 12 ; Yu = 0 otherwise. Set r′u = 2 · ru. Observe
that after the rounding, all variables Y take values in {0, 1}, and the total defending resource used
is R.
For the first set of constraints, observe that for every pair of neighbors u ∈ B and v ∈ V \ A,
(by feasibility of y) at least one of yu, yv is at least 12 . Thus after rounding at least one of them
is 1. In other words, the integral solution satisfies the first set of constraints. For the third, fourth
and fifth sets of constraints, observe that our integral solution increases the defending power pu of
every node u by a factor of 2, while increases yu by a factor of at most 2. Thus these constraints
are all satisfied.
As long as it is possible to achieve defending result α using R2 defending resource, our algo-
rithm (which uses R defending resource) computes a feasible defending strategy in polynomial
time. Thus our algorithm is 2-approximate, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.4.
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Integrality Gap. While we do not have a matching lower bound on the approximation of the
problem, we show that any rounding algorithm based on this LP cannot do better than 2-approximate.
More specifically, there exists an instance for which any solution achieving defending result α re-
quires defending resource R, while there exists a fractional solution for the above LP (using R2
resource) that is feasible. In other words, the integrality gap of the LP relaxation is 2.
Let the graph be two nodes u and v connected by an edge. Let R = wuv = gu = g′u = 1
and g′v = gv = 0. Let LBu = 0 and UBu = 1; LBv = 1 and UBv = 2. In the optimal solution,
by allocating 1 defending resource arbitrarily, the attacker has gain 0. Moreover, if R < 1, then
no matter how the defending resource is distributed, the attacker always gains 1 by attacking u.
However, in the fractional solution, by setting yu = yv = ru = 0.5 and rv = 0, the solution is
actually feasible for the above LP. In other words, the LP is feasible when R = 0.5.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a network security game that allows the sharing of defending resource
between neighbor nodes, and the spread of attack damage to the neighbors of the target. The model
captures features of many real-world applications that are not covered by existing network security
game models. We present polynomial time algorithms for two natural and important special cases
of the problem. We show that the general problem is NP-hard, and propose an LP-rounding based
2-approximation algorithm.
The most interesting open problem is whether the approximation ratio 2 we obtained in Sec-
tion 5 can be improved. While we have shown that our rounding is tight, the integrality gap does
not directly translate to hardness result on inapproximability. We believe that it is possible to prove
an APX-hard result for the general problem.
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